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REGULATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN VIRGINIA: A
SUGGESTION FOR LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENT
Douglas P. Rucker, Jr.*
William C. French**
The American economic system is the most successful yet devel-
oped, and consumer credit has played a vital role in that economy.
Consumer credit has experienced tremendous growth, and has ad-
justed to the demands of changing life-styles, economic needs, and
geographic distinctions, as well as to the different types of consumer
goods which have become available with a minimal amount of gov-
ernment intervention. What government intervention there has
been has involved restraint and restriction.' There now exists the
need to improve the consumer credit industry to enable the citizens
of Virginia to continue to be able to obtain both the necessities and
amenities of life.
Our economic system has always relied heavily upon the market-
place. If sufficient alternative sources compete in that marketplace
for patronage, our system assumes, the price and supply are "fair"
because they are set by free competitive forces. Competition will
have the same effect on the consumer credit marketplace which will
be competitive if its essentials - how much credit, to whom and at
what price - are left to the free choice of consumers.
* B.A., Hampden-Sydney College, 1968; J.D., University of Virginia, 1972. Partner, Sands,
Anderson, Marks & Miller, Richmond, Virginia.
** B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1973; J.D., University of Richmond, 1978; M.B.A.,
University of Richmond, 1979. Associate, Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, Richmond,
Virginia.
1. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE [hereinafter cited as
NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT] at 3 (1972). If anything, state legislation, especially, has
unnecessarily segmented the consumer credit market, thus restraining competition. Many
existing laws and regulations consist of unrealistic rate structures, restrictions on size and
maturities of certain types of loans and licensing practices (convenience and advantage stat-
utes) which restrain free access to the lending market, statutes which promote segmentation
of the supply of credit by limiting the ability of retailers and other types of firms from
marketing "on-premise" cash loans, and other statutes which prohibit savings and loan
associations, mutual savings banks and life insurance companies from providing consumer
credit. Also, most state legislation restricts banks as to branching practices, both inter and
intrastate branch banking, and prohibits banks from availing themselves of legal small loan
rates. Id.
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Virginia legislation, which is similar to that of other states, has
restrained competition, unnecessarly segmented the consumer
credit market, and inhibited competition in that market.' These
impediments to competition should be removed, and the segmenta-
tion of consumer credit suppliers should be de-emphasized, in order
to achieve, insofar as it is consistent with other state policies, the
broadest penetration by all creditors in all areas of consumer credit.
The Virginia General Assembly should assume the role of promot-
ing and maintaining, through appropriate legislation, real competi-
tion in the form of numerous alternate sources of supply of a variety
of forms of consumer credit, and should protect the consumer by
assuring him the "right to know" about such alternate sources.
Furthermore, such competition should regulate the rates as well as
all aspects of credit. It is inconsistent and harmful to both the
consumer and the industry to attempt, as Virginia is now doing, to
regulate and eliminate practices which affect operating costs while
limiting by fiat, the rate charged so that it cannot seek its own
level.3 A competitive system, as will be demonstrated, cannot be
"half free."
I. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND CONSUMER CREDIT
Our economy is now experiencing serious and rampant inflation.
The federal government, in attempting to control this inflation, has
2. Virginia interest rate legislation is based on a general contract maximum (VA. CODE
ANN. § 6.1-330.11 (Repl. Vol. 1979) with numerous narrowly defined exceptions. These excep-
tions include statutory provisions for add-on rates (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.12 to -330.16
(Repl. Vol. 1979)), revolving and monthly rates (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.18 to -330.21 (Repl.
Vol. 1979)), other charges on real estate loans (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.23 to -330.25 (Repl.
Vol. 1979)), transactions not subject to usury (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.37 to -330.42 (Rep.
Vol. 1979)) and borrowers not entitled to plead usury (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.43 and -
330.44 (Repl. Vol. 1979)). Also interest rate regulations for small loan companies provide an
exception to the general contract maximum rate. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-244 to -310 (Repl.
Vol. 1979). There are separate rate regulations which govern every type of lender thus greatly
segmenting the credit market and preventing overall competition for the same, highly mobile
capital.
3. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
In Virginia, the Small Loan Act (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-244 to -.310 (Repl. Vol. 1979))
contains convenience and advantage statutes, basic licensing laws, which restrain free access
to the consumer credit market without undue costs. Also, this Act has effectively eliminated
some creditors' legal collection devices thus increasing bad debt and collection expenses.
When such practices are accompanied by rate structures inconsistent with increased costs
which must be covered, less credit is available than would be during equilibrium conditions.
[Vol. 14:91
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imposed certain price controls and ceilings on some goods and serv-
ices. But these controls and ceilings have not only failed to signifi-
cantly control prices, but have caused a severe dislocation of the
supplies of some goods and services.' Past attempts to control the
price of credit by legislation have been similarly unsuccessful in
protecting and meeting the needs of the citizenry. 5
For example: "General usury statutes and other state laws limit-
ing rates on home mortgages below free market rates have drasti-
cally reduced the availability of mortgage funds, the volume of
home construction, and employment in the building trades."6 Fu-
ture attempts to control the price of credit by legislation should be
avoided.
Since World War II, consumer credit has experienced such growth
that it has become an almost expected part of everyday life.' How-
ever, "[c]onsumer credit is not a Twentieth Century phenomenon
in the United States; it was an accepted fact of life in the early
Colonies." 8 During the Nineteenth Century, usury laws, which this
country had inherited from England, often prevented the granting
of cash loans at economically feasible rates, so a legal installment
loan market was, in essence, nonexistent. By 1900 a flourishing
illegal market developed to meet the existing need for small cash
credit.'
"As a result. . . a model bill known as the Uniform Small Loan
Law was drafted to provide an exception to the usury law so that
consumers could obtain small amounts of legal cash credits at cons-
4. Installment Credit Guide: Consumer Credit, UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Issue No.
299, Aug. 1, 1974 (CCH) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.], Prefatory Note at xii (Final Draft,
Working Redraft No. 6).
5. Id. at x.
6. Id. at xii.
7. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
8. Id.
Not every sturdy and resourceful pioneer paid cash for his staples and his tools as some
accounts of colonial life would have one believe. Furniture was often sold on an installment
basis, and in the Nineteenth Century, pianos, books and sewing machines were sold on the
same basis. M. NEIFELD, NEIFELD'S MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT 16 (1961). In the early
Twentieth Century, automobiles were paid for in monthly payments, and "[tihe rapid
growth of the credit sale of automboiles provided the basis for both the mass market necessary
to their economical production and a remarkable increase in the volume of consumer credit."
E. SELIGMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INSTALLMENT SELLING 42 (1927).
9. I. MICHELMAN, CONSUMER FINANCE: A CASE HISTORY IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 108 (1970).
1979]
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cionable rates."' 0 The development of credit unions (1909) and Mor-
ris Plan banks (1910) provided an increasingly important source of
credit for consumers." Thereafter, commercial banks entered the
installment lending area and became virtually indistinguishable
from Morris Plan banks whenever they were given the privilege of
accepting demand deposits.'2
Since 1950, consumer credit in this country has experienced tre-
mendous growth, increasing over five times - a compound annual
rate of growth of over nine percent.' 3 The increase in the consumer
credit outstanding was caused, in part, by changes in the ability and
willingness of consumers to incur debt and by a continued shift
towards the ownership of assets."
Several factors have encouraged consumers' use of credit. There
has been a profound change in the consumers' "discretionary in-
come" - income over and above that required for necessary ex-
penditures for food, clothing and shelter.'5 Such change can be seen
in the shifts of family incomes in constant dollars.'8 Furthermore,
the development of unemployment benefits and various forms of
health insurance have resulted in more stable real income.' 7 In-
10. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. Initially, the model bill set the rate
ceiling at 42% per annum. Id.
11. I. MICHELMAN, supra note 9, at 191-203. A Morris Plan bank is an industrial bank which
accepts money from depositors for investment in certificates which draw interest periodically.
These banks extend credit primarily to steadily employed salaried people requiring as secu-
rity for repayment the endorsement of two other employed salaried people. The credit require-
ments usually call for installment payments over a one year period. Also, these banks will
make other types of secured loans. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Tulsa County v. Remedial Fin.
Corp., 186 Okl. 648, 100 P.2d 240, 242 (1940).
12. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 5, 93.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id.
15. Id.; discretionary income or supernumerary income is disposable personal income (in-
come after income tax) less necessary living costs such as food and clothing and less fixed
commitments such as debt payments. Many economic forecasters make use of measurements
of discretionary income rather than the usual measures of Gross National Product or disposa-
ble personal income because they feel that the sale of consumer durables relates more closely
to income after the deduction of certain regular expenses than it does to total income. W.
HAYNES AND W. HENRY, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: ANALYSIS AND CASES 149 (1974).
16. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 83 at 6 (1972).
In 1950 less than 50% of all families had incomes of $5,000.00 or more in terms of 1971 dollars,
but by 1971 over 80% had incomes of at least $5,000.00. Id.; NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 5-6.
17. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. Real income is a measure of the real
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creased urbanization of the population coupled with the greater
dependence on money incomes, created a greater dependence on
credit to finance the urban life and to cushion the variability in
money incomes, which encouraged consumers' use of credit."8 The
changing age distribution of the population has affected consumers'
use of credit by allowing young married consumers to use future
income to pay for present purchases.' 9
In the last two decades consumers have become asset ownership
oriented, increasing their ownership of durable consumer goods
through the use of credit. This shift to asset ownership is exempli-
fied by the increase in ownership of.homes since the 1950's.20 This
increase in home ownership has been accompanied by a suburbani-
zation of the population, creating needs for credit to enable consum-
ers to purchase refrigerators, washing machines, lawn mowers,
clothes dryers and, often, second cars.2' Such shift to asset owner-
ship can probably be explained as the consumers' desire to substi-
tute the use of consumer-owned capital goods for the use of
commercially-owned capital goods. 2 Furthermore, the trend to
asset ownership was furthered by the movement of women to the
labor force which freed the housewife from the kitchen and the
dollars of income as compared with some point in time in history thus yielding a constant
dollar value of income for comparable times in history. No doubt, real income has been
bolstered by the addition of unemployment benefits and constant disposable income has
increased with less need for individuals to pay medical expenses and health insurance prem-
iums.
18. Id. Over 15% of the total population of the United States lived on farms in 1950,
however less than 5% lived on farms in 1970. Today the electronic media's widespread availa-
bility has created a uniformity in life styles among farm and urban consumers, therefore, their
demands for consumer credit differ much less than they did in the years prior to 1950. Id.
19. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6; DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Special
Studies, Series P-23, No. 40 at 7 (1972). Between 1950 and 1971 the number of people between
18 and 24 years of age increased by 50% as compared to an increase of only 33% in the number
of persons of all other ages. Id.
20. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Consumer Buying Indicators, Series P-65, No. 40 at 8
(1972); see Fed. Res. Bull. May, 1979.
Although the credit used to acquire homes is not statistically a part of consumer credit
outstanding, with government support of housing the percentage of owner occupied houses
rose from 55% of total housing in 1950 to over 64% in 1970, and the percentage of "two car
families" rose by almost 14% in the 1960's. Id.; see also Fed. Res. Bull., May, 1979.
21. CONSUMER BUYING INDICATORS, supra note 20, at 8; NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 1, at 6.
22. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
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laundry room for recreation and employment which necessitated the
use of labor-saving devices in the home.Y
There are basically two types of consumer credit outstanding: (1)
installment credit (that which is scheduled to be repaid in two or
more payments), and (2) non-installment credit (that which is
scheduled to be repaid in a single, lump sum). Over the last thirty
years installment credit has grown much more repidly than non-
installment credit, ' and this is reflected by the shift to asset owner-
ship - the purchase of consumer durables. During the same period,
consumer installment credit outstanding has risen more rapidly
than monthly installment payments." This is due in part, to the
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 8; Fed. Res. Bull., April, 1979.
CONSUMER CREDIT OUTSTANDING
End of Year, billions of dollars
Total
Consumer Installment Noninstallment
Year Credit Credit Credit
1955 ..................... 38.8 28.9 9.9
1960 ..................... 56.1 43.0 13.2
1961 ..................... 58.0 43.9 14.1
1962 ..................... 63.8 48.7 15.1
1963 ..................... 71.7 55.5 16.3
1964 ..................... 80.3 62.7 17.6
1965 ..................... 89.9 70.9 19.0
1966 ..................... 96.2 76.2 20.0
1967 ..................... 100.8 79.4 21.4
1968 ..................... 110.8 87.7 23.0
1969 ..................... 121.1 97.1 24.0
1970 ..................... 127.0 101.9 25.1
1971 ..................... 138.6 111.2 27.4
1972 ...................... 157.2 126.8 30.5
1973 ..................... 179.0 146.4 32.5
1974 ..................... 188.7 155.4 33.4
1975 ..................... 197.3 162.2 35.0
1976 ..................... 217.8 • 178.8 39.0
Note: Data are revised beginning 1970. Earlier data not strictly comparable. Later data not
available through Federal Reserve Sources. Source: Fed. Res. Bull., April, 1979.
25. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. Fed. Res. Bull. April, 1979. Between
1950 and 1976 consumer installment credit outstanding rose by almost six times while the
annual level of repayments rose by only 4.5 times. Fed. Res. Bull. April, 1979.
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long debt maturities that have become available and, to a smaller
degree, to the development of various forms of revolving credit often
used as a substitute for non-installment credit."
Consumer credit has always been an economic fact of life in the
United States. The growth of consumer credit has naturally accom-
panied the growth of other forms of debt, both public and private.
The rising amount of discretionary income has undoubtedly encour-
aged the use of credit by consumers. Although there has been a large
increase in consumer credit outstanding, a study of available data
in no way indicates a dangerous situation of overindebtedness. A
small portion of the total consumer population resorts to bank-
ruptcy each year, but the majority of consumers are able to meet
their obligations.Y
H'. VIRGINIA INTEREST RATE STATUTES
While a majority of the states have active legislation regulating
interest rates which fix a legal or conventional rate to be applied in
the absence of contract interest and also fix a general maximum
contract rate, in many states there are so many exceptions that the
general contract maximum actually applies only to exceptional
cases.2 Such is the case in Virginia where, by statute, interest rates
and regulations vary depending upon the particular type of credit
transaction and the creditor involved. 29
26. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
27. During the early 1960's the rate of nonbusiness bankruptcies per 100,000 of population
rose from 73 to 85. However, since 1965 there has been a stabilization of bankruptcies in the
nonbusiness sector.
NONBUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES PER
100,000 OF POPULATION
(Fiscal year ending in June)
1961 - 73 1966 - 90 1972 - 79
1962 - 72 1967 - 98 1973 - 74
1963 - 75 1968 - 92 1974 - 80
1964 - 82 1969 - 85 1975 - 105
1965 - 85 1970 - 88 1976 - 98
1971-88 1977-84
28. Banfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraine - The Usury Headache, 19 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 819 (1968).
29. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.6 to -330.48 (Repl. Vol. 1979). The legal rate of interest in
Virginia is 6% per annum, while the general maximum contract rate in Virginia is 8% per
f"979]
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Statutory interest rates range from 5 to 7 percent, and the general
interest laws in most states set a maximum rate of between 8 and
12% per year." Loans to corporations are frequently exempt from
such interest regulations and are subject to a higher maximum, and
in recent years it has been common to provide special rates for home
mortgage loans.3 1 Special statutes in many states permit industrial
loan companies and banks to charge interest and fees without regard
to installment payments which yield 1.5% per month or more.32
Although courts have held that installment sale charges are not
interest, many states have limited installment sale charges by stat-
ute.- Charge-accounts are usually regulated by laws which generally
permit charges of up to 1.5% per month.34
Many consumer finance loan statutes, attempting to legislate
small loans to wage earners under protective regulations, were based
on early models drafted by the Russell Sage Foundation in the early
1900's.3 s Since 1969, the model has frequently been the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.) which applies to credit sales and
loans for consumer purposes up to $25,000.00.31 The U.C.C.C. will
be examined in more detail below.
annum ( §§ 6.1-330.9 and -330.11). The exceptions to the general contract maximum rate
allowed include statutory provisions for add-on rates (§§ 6.1-330.12 to -330.16), revolving and
monthly rates (§§ 6.1-330.18 to -330.21), other charges on real estate loans (§§ 6.1-330.23 to -
330.25), transactions not subject to usury (§§ 6.1-330.37 to -330.42) and borrowers not entitled
to plead usury (§§ 6.1-330.43 and -330.44). Also interest rate regulations for small loan
companies provide an exception to the general contract maximum rate. (§§ 6.1-244 to -310).
These exceptions cover the vast majority of credit market opportunities.
30. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACrS 1978, 72.
31. Id. Virginia provides for home mortgage loan rates depending upon the rate of interest
contracted for and stated within the contract secured by a first deed of trust or first mortgage
on real estate. By statute this transaction is not subject to usury or subject to any special
limitations as to usury. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.37 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
32. Id. Virginia allows any seller or lender engaged in the extension of credit under an open-
end credit plan to charge a service charge not to exceed 1.5% per month on any unpaid
balances not paid in full within 25 days. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.20 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
33. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.21 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
34. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.20 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
35. I. MICHELMAN, CONSUMER FINANCE: A CASE HISTORY IN AMERICAN BusINEsS at 78-82
(1970). In the early 1900's the Russell Sage Foundation studied illegal loan companies in large
cities throughout the United States and disclosed annual rates of charge of well over 200%
which were often accompanied by "harsh collection tactics." Id.
36. The U.C.C.C. was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws which also prepared the widely accepted Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.).
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While Virginia statutes define most interest rate ceilings in terms
of "charge in advance" or what is more commonly known as add-
on interest, 1 lenders and providers of credit are required by truth-
in-lending statutes and Regulation Z to quote the cost of consumer
credit in terms of an annual percentage rate. 8 The statutes which
define interest rates are in conflict with annual percentage rate
disclosure and undoubtedly create confusion among both creditors
and consumers of credit alike. 9
Virginia has a substantial body of legislation which regulates in-
terest rates." While these laws fix a legal or a conventional rate
which applies in the absence of a contract interest rate, they also
fix a general maximum contract rate as well as a judgment rate of
interest.' But Virginia's interest rate legislation does not end there.
There are many exceptions to the general contract maximum rate
allowed, and, in fact, the general contract maximum rate applies
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.12 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.17 (Repl. Vol. 1979); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976); see
generally U.C.C.C. § 3.301(2).
The Federal Truth in Lending Act refers to Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1976) (as amended)).
Prior to Truth-in-Lending it was virtually impossible for a consumer to'compare costs of
credit offered by competing creditors. Interest rates were calculated on diverse bases because
of a bewildering variety of state laws, differing by types of creditor and category of credit.
Truth-in-Lending provides one standard measure of interest rates applicable to all credit
transactions that would include all the costs of credit in a single calculation. This concept is
called annual percentage rate (APR). Accurate computation of APR is vital to banks under
control of the Federal Reserve Bank due to Regulation Z, a regulation issued by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
39. Certain creditors in Virginia are regulated by rate ceilings which allow them to "charge
in advance" a legislated rate of interest per centum per annum. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.13
to -330.15 (Repl. Vol. 1979). "Charge in advance" when applied to installment loans means
that the interest may be added to the principal amount of the note but may not be deducted
from the amount. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.12 (Repl. Vol. 1979). Since the interest charged is
added to the principal amount of the loan the actual interest paid (APR) for such a loan is
somewhat higher than the statutory rate depending upon the amount, duration and payment
requirements of the particular loan. Virginia law, in compliance with Truth-in-Lending,
requires that the cost of consumer credit be quoted in terms of APR. VA. CODE: ANN. § 6.1-
330.17 (Repl. Vol. 1979). Therefore, creditors in Virginia must calculate their interest charges
in at least two different manners in order to assure compliance with Virginia law as well as
Truth-in-Lending.
40. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.9 to -330.48 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
41. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.9 to .11 (Repl. Vol. 1979). The legal rate of interest is 6%,
the judgment rate of interest is 8% and the maximum contract rate of interest is 8%, all on
an annual basis.
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only to exceptional cases.42 Such interest rate legislation provides
different maximum allowable rate charges depending upon the type
of creditor.43 Types of creditors specifically spelled out in Virginia
interest rate legislation range from banks and savings and loan asso-
ciations to credit unions and industrial loan associations.', Such
legislation also limits the charges allowable for small loans and
charges by sellers and lessors of consumer goods. 5
Virginia interest rate legislation is at best confusing. It also re-
strains competition by interest rate ceilings which restrict the
amount of available credit for all types of consumers."
Ill. U.C.C.C., THE ECONOMICS OF RATES AND AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT
The U.C.C.C. advocates abolishing the "patchwork welter of prior
laws on consumer credit" and replacing it with a single, comprehen-
sive law with a modern, theoretical and pragmatic structure
"designed to provide an adequate volume of credit at reasonable
cost under conditions fair to both consumers and creditors.
47
"[S]eparate, uncoordinated statutes governing the activities of dif-
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.11 (Repl. Vol. 1979). Supra note 29.
43. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.13 to .16, .18 to .21, .23 and .24 (Rel. Vol. 1979). Banks and
savings and loan associations charge in advance at a rate of 7% per annum while industrial
loan associations and lendors other than those licensed by the State Corporation Commission
or the federal government may charge in advance at a rate of 8% per annum. Credit unions
may lend to their members at a rate not to exceed 1% per month, computed on unpaid
balances, as compared with revolving credit rates of 1.5% per month. Sellers of consumer
goods may charge a rate not to exceed 2% per month on the balance at the end of the billing
period next preceding each successive payment. Id.
44. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.13 to -330.16, -330.18, -330.21, -330.23 and -330.24 (Repl. Vol.
1979).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.21 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
46. See supra notes 39 and 45.
Because capital is so mobile, thus providing an effective method of shifting resources in
the economy to their utmost potential, it is difficult to insulate that part of the capital market
which comprises consumer credit from other segments of the market. Attempts to reduce
interest rates in one part of the market are likely to drive funds out of that segment and into
more rewarding uses, thereby showing the effect which will be produced given interference
with the free market system. Rate ceilings tend to produce "savings" for the small number
of debtors who will be served in the "protective" portion of the market. However, any
"savings" is at the expense of those who can no longer be provided credit at the reduced rates.
I. FRIEND, ET. AL., STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LoAN INDUSTRY (Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
1969).
47. U.C.C.C., supra note 4, Prefatory Note at viii.
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ferent types of creditors in disparate ways . . ." would be elimi-
nated. 8
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws followed several basic assumptions in drafting the U.C.C.C.
Its members believed that consumer credit legislation should be
contained in one uniform law to provide quick and effective inter-
pretation from a legal viewpoint. 9 They also believed it would per-
petuate the successful American philosophy of permitting competi-
tion to determine prices of non-monopoly commodities and services.
This philosophy was thought to be applicable to the pricing of
money market rates determining consumer credit interest rates.
The National Conference realized, however, that in order for compe-
tition to exist and effectively determine the pricing of money and
credit, there was a need to avoid any monopoly in the consumer
credit market.5' Relatively easy entry into the market was neces-
sary 2 There was also a need to make all credit recipients as equal
as possible. An attempt was made to eliminate or minimize controls
by knowledgeable and sophisticated credit recipients while at the
same time providing protection for less sophisticated credit recipi-
ents by requiring uniform disclosure of credit costs and terms. Usury
laws were not believed to be an effective means of fixing all prices
in the various interest rate markets.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at x to xii.
51. Id. at xii to xiii.
52. Id. at xii.
53. Id. at xi.
The U.C.C.C. has been adopted in the following jurisdictions:
Jurisdiction Effective Date Statutory Citation
Colorado 10-1-1971 C.R.S. '73, §§5-1-101 to 5-9-103.
Idaho 7-1-1971 I.C. §§28-31-101 to 28-39-108.
Indiana 10-1-1971 I.C. 1971, §§24-4.5-101 to
24-4.5-6-203.
Iowa 6-3-74* I.C.A. §§537.1101 to 537.7103.
Kansas 1-1-1974 K.S.A. 16a-1-101 to 16a-9-102.
Maine 3-27-1974* 9A M.R.S.A. §§1-101 to 6-415.
Oklahoma 7-1-1969 14A Old. St. Ann. §§1-101 to 9-103.
South Carolina 1-1-1975 Code 1962, §§8-800.101 to
8-800.541.
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Interactions of suppliers of credit and potential borrowers must
be free from all restrictions. In general, any kind of imperfection in
the credit market can have a potential effect on credit availability.
The most common imperfections are legal constraints, regardless of
intent, and the most significant legal constraints are rate ceilings,
restrictions on other credit terms (such as loan size and maturity),
restrictions on the entry into the market of new suppliers of credit,
and limitations on creditors' remedies. The legal factors which have
perhaps the greatest effect on the availability of credit are restric-
tive rate ceilings which limit the number of borrowers who qualify
for legal credit and reduce the amount of credit supplied.54 Ease of
market entry for new suppliers is a basic principle of any free com-
petition system, and any barriers to entry in the consumer credit
market will lessen competition.5
The U.C.C.C. was drafted on the premise that credit availability
could be defined as the degree to which creditors are willing to
provide credit at the free market rate in a world without imperfec-
tions." Although that is somewhat unrealistic, the ideal market (one
without imperfections) can be successfully used to assess the rela-
tive availability of credit under market conditions that deviate from
the ideal. The U.C.C.C. strives for a truly competitive market in
which rates reach competitive equilibrium levels through a series of
adjustments by suppliers of various credit offers to various risk
* Date of approval.
Kansas, Maine and Iowa adopted the major provisions of the 1974 U.C.C.C., but their adop-
tions contain numerous variations, omissions and additional matter. Most other states that
adopted the U.C.C.C. did so with only minor variations, e.g., provisions relating to billing
errors, credit card sales and credit discrimination. All of the adoptions referred to above were
made before the final version of the U.C.C.C. as promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its 1974 meeting. 7 U.L.A. BUSINESS & FINANCE
LAws 583 (1978).
54. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER
CREDIT MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES (D. Greer & R. Shay eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Greer & Shay]. Interest rate ceilings often lead to increased market concentration which
forces less sufficient credit suppliers out of the market because they cannot compete at the
restricted rate. As a result, the remaining creditors control a larger share of the market. If
the degree of market concentration is sufficient to induce noncompetitive behavior, credit
availability will be further reduced. Sales credit rate ceilings, are usually nonexistent or very
high. If the rate is set too low, creditors are often forced to shift a portion of the finance charge
into the cash price, thereby forcing cash buyers to subsidize credit buyers.
55. U.C.C.C., supra note 4, Prefatory Note at xii.
56. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 112.
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classes of consumers.57 These equilibrium levels allow creditors to
cover cost and to earn a normal return on invested capital. Then
creditors are willing to extend any amount of credit to qualified
borrowers at such profitable rates. This can be characterized as full
credit availability.5
Economic historians have developed two conflicting views as to
how reasonable rates for consumer credit transactions can be as-
sured. One view is that the price of credit should be established by
the market, unhindered by direct government interference ("free
rates")." The other view is that there should be price ceilings on
consumer credit ("decreed rates")."°
The position of the drafters of the U.C.C.C. approaches the free
rates view and is perhaps best stated by noted economist Milton
Friedman:
I know of no economist of any standing. . . who has favored a legal
limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders re-
ceived-though there must have been some .... Bentham's explan-
ation of the "mischief and the anti-usurious laws" is also as valid
today as when he wrote that these laws preclude "many people, alto-
gether from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their
respective exigencies." For still others, they render "the terms so
much the worse . . . While, out of loving-kindness, or whatsoever
other motive, the law precludes a man from borrowing, upon terms
which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from
selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous." His conclu-
sion: "The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon dis-
tress.""'
While many reasons have been advanced to justify placing upper
limits on interest rates charged for the use of credit, the most often
57. Id. In an imperfect credit market, many creditors set a "base rate" for potential debt
customers and accept only those sufficiently creditworthy to meet the "base rate". Whereas
under perfectly competitive conditions, a credit grantor would have to give a rate consistent
with the debtor's risk or else lose the business to another more willing creditor.
58. Greer & Shay, supra note 54.
59. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 91. Milton Friedman and Jeremy Ben-
tham are two noted economists who espouse this view. Id.
60. Id. Economist Leon Keyserling is a supporter of this viewpoint. Id.
61. Friedman, Defense of Usury, NEWSWEEK, April 6, 1970, at 79 (emphasis added).
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
voiced justification stresses that the unequal bargaining power of
debtors versus creditors would allow the creditors to charge what the
credit market will bear: the ceiling rate. Advocates of interest rate
ceilings assume that most consumers are not knowledgeable about
the complexities of finance charges, are incapable or unwilling to
use Truth-In-Lending information and do not shop for credit.62 The
drafters of the U.C.C.C., on the other hand, believe that only when
the interest rate price ceiling is set at or below the market rate for
the particular form of credit placed under price control, will rates
rise to the ceiling. 3 Persuasive evidence that rates do not inevitably
rise to the ceiling was significantly reinforced in the study by the
National Commission on Consumer Finance of rates prevailing for
various forms of consumer credit. 4 If a rate is set above the market
rate, the market rate will prevail and average rates of charge will
not rise to the statutory ceilings. However, if rate ceilings are set at
or below the market rate, rates will generally be at the ceiling.65
Credit consumers are certainly not wholly knowledgeable about
finance charges, nor do they appear to shop as intensely as they do
for the financed goods. Ignorance and inertia among borrowers,
combined with the absence of competition among suppliers, can
often lead to higher interest rates in some consumer credit mar-
kets'.7 "As a result, unequal bargaining power may exist, and in the
62. Fritz, Would the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, BUSINESS LAW,
January, 1970, at 512.
Economist Leon Keyserling testifying before the Congressional Subcommittee on Con-
sumer Affairs of the Committee on Banking and Currency stated:
I find it deplorable that we feel bound to set an 18 percent interest rate ceiling for these
people, which is three times the rate at which a powerful corporation can borrow money
on bonds while many of our greatest corporations finance themselves and do not have
interest costs of large significance. I think the ceiling shouuld be very much lower...
I am not going to take the position that even 12 percent is a conscionable interest rate
for the kind of people borrowing money for these kinds of purposes. They ought to be
able to borrow for much less, even if this requires new public programs.
NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 91.
63. U.C.C.C., supra note 4, Prefatory Note at xi.
64. M. SCHOLER & R. SHAY, STATE & REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE PRICE AND VOLUME OF THE
MAJOR TYPES OF CONSUMER INSTALLATION CREDIT IN MID-1971 (NCCF, 1972); R. SHAY, THE
IMPACT OF STATE LEGAL RATE CEILINGS UPON THE AVAILABILITY AND PRICE o CONSUMER INSTALL-
MENT CREDIT (NCCF, 1972).
65. R. SHAY, THE IMPACT OF STATE LEGAL RATE CEILINGS UPON THE AVAILABILITY AND PRICE
OF CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDIT (NCCF, 1972).
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absence of alternate credit sources, leads to higher rates, or re-
stricted credit availability (or both) ... -
Perfect knowledge and intense shopping behavior are not, how-
ever, prerequisites to a workably competitive maket. In order for a
market to offer opportunities for credit at reasonable rates, there
need only be some consumers who are willing to shift to lower rate
or price sources in a market where existing competitors compete and
where new competitors enjoy ease of entry. 7 "[Tihe use of (inter
est) rate ceilings to correct instances of unequal bargaining power
and an absence of alternative credit sources is largely ineffective." 8
The philosophy of the U.C.C.C. lends itself to competition and ease
of entry by new competitors into the consumer credit market,
thereby enabling consumers to shift to lower rate or price sources.6"
On balance, consumer credit rate ceilings are undesirable when
credit markets are reasonably competitive. Perhaps economist Jer-
emy Bentham best summarizes the futility and improbabilities as-
sociated with credit rate ceilings. It was his position that rate ceil-
ings on consumer credit transactions do not assure that most con-
sumers will pay a fair price for the use of credit and do not prevent
overburdening them with excessive debt. Ultimately, Bentham
noted, rate ceilings restrict the supply of credit and eliminate credit
from consumer credit markets.70 This situation can be changed by
eliminating rate ceilings and relying on competition to ensure that
borrowers pay reasonable rates for the use of credit. But rate ceilings
cannot be eliminated until workably competitive credit markets
66. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 96.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 99.
69. U.C.C.C., supra note 4, Prefatory Note at xii.
In advocating primary reliance on the market place to control the price of credit,
the National Conference has recognized the fundamental importance of competition
to permit market forces to operate most effectively, a recognition consistent with the
conclusions of the National Commission on Consumer Finance. In moving away from
the segmented controls of particular types of credit grantors in consumer credit laws
prior to the U.C.C.C. to a single comprehensive statute dealing with consumer credit
generally, it is believed that competition has been and will be enhanced.
Id.
70. J. BENTHAM, DEFENCE OF USUI&Y SHEWING THE IMPOLICY OF THE PRESENT LEGAL RE-
STRAINTS ON THE TERMS OF PEcUNIARY BARGAINS; IN LETrERS TO A FRIEND TO WHICH IS ADDED A
LETTER TO ADAM SMITH, ESQ., LL.D. ON THE DISCOURAGEMENT OPPOSED BY THE ABovE RE-
STRAINTS TO THE PROGRESS OF INVENTIVE INDUSTRY, at 29 (3d ed. 1816).
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exist. Policies designed to promote competition should be given first
priority, with adjustment of rate ceilings used as a complement to
expand the availability of credit. Then, as the development of work-
ably competitive markets decreases the need for rate ceilings to
combat market power in concentrated markets, those ceilings may
be raised or removed. The U.C.C.C. is promulgated in accordance
with these ideas and goals.
While the drafters of the U.C.C.C. strove to provide for competi-
tion within the consumer credit market to allow for lower interest
rates, they were not unaware of problems which could arise within
the consumer credit area. Perhaps the most compelling of such
problems is whether credit rate ceilings assure that debtors pay fair
rates for money borrowed. Are credit rates fair for some or for all,
and fair for whom, if not for all? There is also a problem in judging
the fairness of rates without judging the associated terms under
which credit is granted; without doubt, the entire credit package -
the credit offer function - is complex with features that have differ-
ing values to different debtors.7' There exists no generally accepta-
ble standard for which a fair rate of interest can be determined.
Consumers' eagerness to acquire goods and services financed with
credit and a desire of creditors to provide credit create a climate
conducive to the growth of excessive use of credit. Forces exist and
operate within the credit system, however, to counteract excessive
use of credit. Creditors hesitate to extend credit if they doubt that
the consumer can repay the loan. Every extension of credit becomes
a debt, and as the consumer becomes progressively burdened with
the debt, the odds against repayment increase, and the likelihood
that the creditor will accept the applicant decreases.7 1
Although it is suggested that credit grantors and consumers have
been cautious in arranging obligations, some individual consumers
have problems repaying their debts. Since 1965, there has been a
stabilization of bankruptcies in the non-business sector.7 3 A survey
71. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 103. The credit offer function is made
up of such ever changing variables as (1) amount borrowed, (2) credit duration, (3) repayment
schedule, (4) debtor risk class, (5) type of security, if any, (6) interest rate charged and (7)
class of credit transaction (i.e., cash credit v. sales credit).
72. Id.
73. M. Ryan & E. Maynes, The Excessively Indebteded. Who and Why, J. CONS. AFF. 107-
26 (1968). Supra note 27.
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conducted by the National Commission on Consumer Finance
showed that unemployment and illness were the first and third most
important reasons, respectively, for debtors' failures to meet their
obligations, which supports a basic assumption of our economic
system that most consumers and creditors are rational. 4 The basic
principles underlying the U.C.C.C. are good for the consumer and
for the consumer credit market. The problem, if any, of excessive
use of credit does not reflect on the basic assumptions underlying
the U.C.C.C.
IV. AUTOMOBILE FINANCING: AN ILLUSTRATION"
Over fifty-eight percent of automobile consumer installment
credit in the United States is held by commercial banks, and over
fifty-five percent of that debt is held by way of "indirect paper." 6
In Virginia, as elsewhere, there are basically two types of automobile
consumer credit: that which originates with the dealer (and is avail-
able to become indirect paper held by commercial banks) and that
which originates with a bank or some other financial institution as
a direct lending contract. 71
Most indirect automobile consumer credit or third-party loans are
"bought" from the automobile dealer by either commercial banks
or the automobile dealer's credit corporation, e.g., Ford Credit,
Chrysler Credit and G.M.A.C. The interest rate on these indirect
loans is governed by statute and yields a maximum rate of 2% per
month.78 The indirect loans are capable of yielding interest income
of 24% per annum on annual percentage rate ("APR") basis, while
direct loans made by commercial banks or other financial institu-
tions can yield only in a range of from 7% add-on to 8% add-on" plus
74. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 101.
75. Much of the data contained in this section was obtained by means of interviews with
local commercial bank officers and automobile dealers and from surveys of existing interest
rates across the state. The other sources cited herein bear out the findings from such inter-
views and surveys.
76. Fed. Res. Bull., May, 1979. Indirect paper or third-party loans are loans made by one
creditor (i.e., automobile dealer) and then "bought" from the first creditor by a second
creditor such as a commercial bank.
77. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 114-15.
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.21 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
79. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.13 to .16 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
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a one time, 2% service charge.'" The typical 7% add-on loan for
$3,000.00 with a 2% service charge yields an APR of 10.47% if paid
over a three month period and 12.88% if paid in thirty months. This
is quite a bit less than the 24% APR possibility for dealer financing
of consumer goods directly.81
As previously demonstrated, however, such differences in interest
rate ceilings, based solely upon where the consumer seeks to obtain
the necessary credit, are not as important as the amount of competi-
tion in a particular credit market in Virginia. In the city of Rich-
mond, for example, a very competitive automobile consumer in-
stallment credit market exists, and. indirect consumer installment
credit loans and direct consumer installment credit loans are made
at basically the same rate, i.e. between 5.5% and 6.5% add-on.12 The
interest rate for indirect financing is often the same or lower than
the rate for direct financing in such a competitive market. There is
less cost involved to the ultimate supplier of the credit funds -
usually the commercial bank" - because there is little overhead
involved in its processing of indirect paper.
Because the bank sets the dealer's rate and buys the paper from
the dealer, there is little need for costly advertising. The automobile
dealer does essentially all the paper work, and the bank, which
works very closely with the dealer, thereby acquires a new "branch"
which specializes in the installment credit lending business. 4 The
benefits to the consumer are abundant under such circumstances,
and therein lies the major virtue of the highly competitive consumer
installment credit market.8 5
In most of the state, especially in rural areas with a heavy market
concentration by a particular creditor, the automobile consumer
installment credit market is not competitive. Forty to sixty percent
of the consumer installment credit portfolios of commercial banks
doing business in those areas consist of indirect or third-party lend-
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.13 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.21 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
82. Supra note 75.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
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ing contracts. 6 But this does not reflect the total magnitude of
indirect or third-party lending contracts in the state because of the
large number of indirect loans purchased from dealers by the auto-
motive credit corporations.
In such rural areas, where competition for loans is not keen, the
automotive credit corporations and other financial institutions
demand and get any interest rate that the market will bear: 1.5%
to 2.5% add-on higher than rates in the competitive market areas
of Virginia, or, expressed as APR, 2% to 4.5% higher. 7
The inequities of the automobile consumer credit market in Vir-
ginia clearly illustrate that the competitiveness of credit markets
has a tremendous influence on the interest rate which consumers
will have to pay for installment credit. Interest rate ceilings have
only limited competitiveness in certain consumer installment credit
markets, and do not benefit the consumer. To alter this unhealthy
situation, new lenders must be allowed to generate a fair rate of
return on their capital funds or they will lack the incentive to be-
come competitors in the market.8 To have unequal interest rate
ceilings for dealers and non-dealer lenders is harmful to the con-
sumer. A change is needed so that all consumer installment credit
lenders will be able to obtain a fair return. The result will be that
over the long-term, competition among creditors will keep interest
rates at as low a level as possible in light of the overall money and
capital markets.
Simply stated, using the automobile financing example outlined
above:
1. Virginia automobile dealers, unlike non-dealer suppliers of
consumer credit, are permitted by statute86 to charge interest on
credit extended to the consumer at a rate which could reach 24%
APR.
2. In most of the state the automobile consumer credit market
is not competitive. The dealers, induced by their creditors to do so,
often demand and get whatever rate the market will bear, limited
86. Supra note 75.
87. Id.
88. Supra notes 55 and 67.
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.21 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
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only by a statute which is really no limit at all. The dealers sell such
high interest paper only to their creditors, presumably in return for
concessions as to the dealers' own financing needs.
3. In the Richmond area, on the other hand, where competition
is keener in the automobile consumer credit market, financing is at
much lower interest rates.
4. In order to treat the other citizens of the state to Richmond-
area-rates, the solution is simple: allow non-dealers to enter the
consumer credit market presently protected by statute for that spe-
cial class of creditor, the dealer. Eliminate the distinction between
lenders made by that statute. The resulting increase in competition
will undoubtedly provide lower interest rates in the automobile con-
sumer credit markets throughout much of the state.
V. CONCLUSION
The primary roles of legislation and regulation in the consumer
credit area should be to promote and assure the maintenance of real
competition in the form of numerous alternate sources of supply of
a variety of forms of consumer credit and to provide, so far as is
possible, for informed consumer credit decisions. Virginia, as most
other states, has developed a complex pattern of exemptions from
the usury and interest rate laws. The Virginia General Assembly
should remove impediments to competition and segmentation of
consumer credit suppliers to achieve the broadest penetration by all
creditors in all fields of consumer credit. Such legislative action
would assure the consumer of a "variety of credit sources and types
of credit and, consequently . . . the benefits of a competitive mar-
ketplace."9 To assure that competition is meaningful, legislators
and regulators must also be vigilant in providing the basis for the
consumers' "right to know."9' Perhaps the General Assembly should
follow the cue of the U.C.C.C. and act in a positive manner to
provide consumer credit laws in a single, well-ordered code, easily
understandable to all concerned - creditors, consumers and their
lawyers. This would contain realistic interest rate ceilings that will
foster legitimate credit markets and allow the forces of competition
90. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
91. Id. at 4.
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to seek natural and reasonable levels of interest rate charges -
equilibrium levels - while providing full disclosure of credit trans-
actions to all consumers. At the very least, the arbitrary distinction
between financing by retail sellers of consumer goods (dealers) and
other lenders should be immediately abolished by legislative
amendment so that there can be an increase in the number of sup-
pliers of credit to Virginia consumers.
Although relatively few states have adopted the U.C.C.C., Vir-
ginia would be well advised, in the face of an ever expanding eco-
nomic environment, to adopt legislation based upon the principles
underlying the U.C.C.C. This would provide its citizens with a rea-
sonable balance between the interests of consumers and the inter-
ests of the consumer credit industry.

